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FURMAV V. GEORGIA - DEATHKNELL
FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?
On the morning of June 29, 1972, death row inmates at the Geor-
gia State Prison in Reidsville suddenly began to shout and cheer. They
had just heard a radio newscaster announce that the United States
Supreme Court had struck down the death penalty as presently im-
posed. Lucious Jackson, Jr., a convicted rapist, poignantly summed
up the emotions of those marking time in death row cellblocks across
the country: "I've been thinking about death for a long time. Now
I can think about living."'
Writs of certiorari, limited to the question of whether the death
sentences in the cases under review were unconstitutional "cruel and
unusual" punishments, 2 had been granted to Jackson, to William Fur-
man, convicted of murder in Georgia, and to Elmer Branch, convicted
of rape in Texas. The Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, held 5-4
that "the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these
cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 3 Each of the nine Justices filed
a separate opinion in the case. The failure of any majority Justice to
adopt the reasoning of any other has clouded the standards to be em-
ployed in considering eighth amendment claims and raises at least
two additional questions: the fate of capital punishment in those
narrow instances where it has not been abolished and the possible ap-
plication of the various rationales offered by the Justices to other
penalties and exercises of discretion.
Two members of the majority, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
found the death penalty unconstitutional per se. The remaining three,
Justices Douglas, Stewart and White, condemned capital punishment
as imposed under the discretionary sentencing systems favored by most
states but did not reach the question of the constitutionality of a man-
datory death penalty. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist based their dissenting opinions on the argument
that the Court's holding violates the root principles of stare decisis
and the separation of powers.
1 Washington Post, June 30, 1972, at A13, col. 1.
2 403 U.S. 952 (1971). Certiorari was also granted to Earnest Aikens of California, a
convicted murderer, but the grant was dismissed, Aikens v. California, No. 68-5027, cert.
dismissed, 406 U.S. 813 (1972), in light of the Supreme Court of California's decision
striking down the death penalty on state constitutional grounds, People v. Anderson, 3
Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
S Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
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HISTORY OF THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE
The forfeiture of life as punishment for breach of an accepted
standard of human conduct is a penalty as ancient as man himself.4
The oldest recorded instance of human execution for crime appears
circa 1500 B.C. in the Amherst papyri.5 The Bible is replete with ref-
erences to the death penalty for crimes such as murder,6 adultery,7
bestiality," and rape,9 and, in addition, mentions some of the methods
employed to exact the supreme penalty.' In England, the laws of
Alfred (871-901) authorized capital punishment" but execution was
left to private enforcement. During the reign of Henry II (1154-1189)
this burden began to shift to the State and the rule of personal ven-
geance was gradually replaced with the recognition that the infliction
of death was more than a purely private affair.1 With the rise of the
absolute monarch and the emergence of the modem nation, the ex-
ecution of capital punishment became the exclusive prerogative of the
State.13
While the pages of the history of capital punishment are filled
with descriptions of the numerous petty crimes which once warranted
the death penalty'4 and the barbaric means employed in its execu-
tion,'6 attempts were made from the earliest days to place some limita-
tions on its application. Lex talionis,16 the familiar "eye for an eye"
injunction of the Mosaic law,17 at least replaced unrestricted retalia-
tion with a maximum permissible punishment. 8 In addition, the rab-
4 In some ancient cultures, however, the death penalty was virtually unknown. See,
e.g., 2 J. EsCARRA, CODE P1NAL DE LA RkPUBLIQUE DE CHINE at xxv (1950).
5 J. LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2 (1960).
6 Genesis 9:6; Exodus 21:12.
7 Leviticus 20:21.
8 Exodus 22:18.
9 Deuteronomy 22:25.
10 E.g., Leviticus 21:9 (burning); Deuteronomy 22:21 (stoning).
113 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 24 (1883) [hereinafter
STEPHEN].
12 G. Scott, HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5 (1950) [hereinafter ScoTT].
13 The complete history of capital punishment is summarized in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 333-42, (Marshall, J., concurring) and in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196-
203 (1971). See Ancel, The Problem of the Death Penalty, in T. SELLN, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 5 (1967).
14 See Bedau, Introduction to THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (H. Bedau ed. 1967)
[hereinafter BEDAU].
15 See Scorr, supra note 12, at 19-33.
16 The law of retribution. BLACK'S LAw DICrioNARY 1058 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Literally,
the law of "equality" or "equivalency". See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 844 (1969) [hereinafter
Granucci].
17 Exodus 21:25.
18 Granucci, supra note 16, at 844.
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binical court or sanhedrin espoused a philosophy of criminal
punishment which rendered execution a highly unlikely occurrence.19
Prior to the Norman conquest in 1066, England operated under
a codification of the lex talionis promulgated by King Alfred (circa
900 A.D.).20 This new system reflected the various Germanic, 21 Greek,22
and Roman23 influences on English punishment theory and generally
apportioned penalties according to the gravity of the crime committed.
With the advent of William the Conqueror, however, the old law dis-
appeared and a new system of amercements, or fines, was substituted
for the traditional "eye for an eye" approach. The amounts of these
amercements were entirely discretionary and their imposition was soon
abused in an effort to increase royal revenue. Eventually the nobility
was compelled to put an end to the ruinous system of discretionary
fining and in 1215 King John was forced to include three chapters ban-
ning excessive fines in the Magna Carta.24 This prohibition was ex-
tended to include corporal punishments by a fourteenth century
document that purported to be a copy of the laws of Edward the Con-
fessor (1042-66),25 and was recognized judicially in the 1615 case of
Hodges v. Humkin, Mayor of Liskerret.2 6 wherein the court ruled that
"imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the
offense .... .,-7
The first use of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" ap-
pears in the Declaration of Rights of 1689.28 James II was accused of
19 Perhaps most indicative of the rabbinical attitude toward capital punishment is the
following passage from the Talmud:
A sanhedrin which executes a criminal once in seven years is called a "court
of destroyers." Rabbi Eliezer ben Azariah states this is so even if it executes one
every seventy years.
Makkot 1:7.
20 Granucci, supra note 16, at 844.
21 The Norsemen standardized their system of crime and punishment by listing
offenses and their punishments in the Gulathing and Frustathing laws. T. DuFrA, THE
VIKING LAWs AND THE MAGNA CARTA 51-52 (1963).
22 Aristotle offered the theory that inequality, regardless of at who's expense, was
unjust. ETIcs 148-49 (Penguin Classics ed. 1955).
23 The Twelve Tables authorized execution for certain specified crimes. See J.
LAURENCE, A IsroRY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 3 (1960).
24 MAGNA CARTA, chs. 20-22 (1215). See Trop v. Dulles, 556 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality
opinion of Warren, C.J.).
25 Granucci, supra note 16, at 846.
26 E. BULSTRODE, THE REPORTS OF EDwARD BULSTRODE (Cases in King's Bench, 1609-
1626) (2d ed. 1668).
27 Id. at 139-40. See Granucci, supra note 16, at 847.
28 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 623 (4th ed.
1873).
Following James' defeat and his flight from England, a convention of the estates
of the realm proposed the Declaration and presented it to William and Mary when they
were tendered the crown. The new monarchs, anxious to secure their support, quickly
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having committed a number of crimes. Among the charges were the
following: "excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel
punishments inflicted." The Bill of Rights thus declared "that exces-
sive bail ought not to be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted." 29
The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the English Bill of
Rights has been characterized as an objection to the imposition of pun-
ishments which were not within the jurisdiction of the sentencing court
nor authorized by statute. Further, the clause served as a reiteration of
the policy against disproportionate penalties which policy, by 1689,
had become firmly imbedded in English law.30
The clause was soon utilized in an attempt by Lord Devonshire
to have an excessive fine reduced by the Court of King's Bench. The
House of Lords, in reviewing the case, decided that the fine "was ex-
cessive and exorbitant, against Magna Charta, the common right of the
subject and the law of the land."3'
Opinions differ as to what the framers of the American eighth
amendment intended in employing the English terms "cruel and un-
usual." It has been suggested 32 that, through a misinterpretation of
assented to it. The Bill of Rights was enacted shortly thereafter by the Convention
Parliament and is identical to the Declaration but for the inclusion of material not
relevant here. See F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HSTORY OF ENGLAND 283-84 (1913);
H. HALLAM, CONSTITtIONAL HISrORY OF ENGLAND 547-49 (1859). See also Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 US. 86,
100 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 463 (1947); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892).
29 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, preamble, cl. 10 (1689).
Professor Granucci reaches the conclusion that the impetus for the inclusion of the
clause in the Declaration was provided by the trial of Titus Oates, who received harsh and
apparently illegal punishments for his part in the Popish Plot. See Granucci, supra note
16, at 857-59.
Other commentators believe that the clause was incorporated into the Declaration in
reaction to the inhumane punishments inflicted by Jeffreys during the Bloody Assizes.
See, e.g., 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARES ON THE CONSTITUnON OF THE UNITED STATES § 1903, at
650 (5th ed. 1891).
30 Granucci, supra note 16, at 847, 860.
Blackstone commented on the policy of restricting the response of the state to punish-
ments not disproportionate to the crimes committed:
But, indeed, were capital punishments proved by experience to be a sure and
effectual remedy, that would not prove the necessity . . . of inflicting them upon
all occasions when other expedients fail. I fear this reasoning would extend a
great deal too far. For instance, the damage done to our public road by loaded
wagons is universally allowed, and many laws have been made to prevent it; none
of which have hitherto proved effectual. But it does not therefore follow that it
would be just for the legislature to inflict death upon every obstinate carrier who
defeats or eludes the provisions of former statutes ....
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2164-65 (Jones' ed. 1916).
31 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 376 (1910).
32 Granucci, supra note 16, at 860.
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Blackstone, the framers assumed a meaning at variance with the English
understanding: that they supposed the words to have a meaning derived
from the Bloody Assizes, the writings of Sir Robert Beale3 and the
work of Nathaniel Ward of Massachusetts,3 4 i.e., that the clause pro-
hibited inhumane, inherently cruel punishment rather than excessive,
disproportionate or illegal punishment. The courts have taken a more
expansive view of the framers' intent:
It is clear, however, that in this country the phrase was understood
to encompass the former and to prohibit both new forms of physi-
cal cruelty and existing punishments which courts might later hold
to be cruel.35
This interpretation did not exclude the condemnation of dispropor-
tionate penalties, as reference to the relevant provisions of the newly
independent states' constitutions will demonstrate. Cruel and unusual
punishment clauses36 were incorporated into eight of these documents3
and two states specifically included language requiring proportionality
of punishments.38
33Beale's most influential work, A Book against Oaths Ministered in the Courts of
Ecclesiastical Commission, is a vigorous protest against state torture and inhuman treat-
ment. See Granucci, supra note 16, at 848.
34 "For bodilie punishments we allow none that are inhumane, barbarous, or cruel."
Ward, Body of Liberties, in R. PERRY, SoURcEs oF OuR LaaBERTs 153 (1959).
This provision was enacted by the Massachusetts General Court in 1641. See W.
Wsinrzort, COLONIAL LAWS OF 1660-1672, at 8 (1889). See also MAssAcHUsrrs SPECIAL
COMMISSION ESTABLISHED FOR THE PuRPOsE OF INVESTIGATING AND STUDYING THE ABOLITION
OF THE DArH PFNALTY IN CAPITAL CASES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 98 (1958) [herein-
after MAss. REPORT].
35 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 646-47, 493 P.2d 880, 892, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,
164, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
36 George Mason's draft of the Constitution of Virginia, adopted on June 12, 1776,
contained a Declaration of Rights which provided "[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be
required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
F. THORPE, F mERAL AND STATE CONsrrruONs 3813 (1909) [hereinafter THORPE]; R. RUTLAND,
THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791 at 35-36, 232 (1952).
37 DL. CODE ANN., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, 16 (1953).
MD. CONsT. § 22 (1776), 3 THORPE 1688, see also id. § 14:
That sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, as far as is consistent with the
safety of the state: and no law, to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties,
ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter.
MASS. CONsr. art. 26 (1780), 3 THORPE 1892.
N.H. CONST. § 33 (1784), 4 THORPE 2457.
N.C. CONsr. § 10 (1776), 5 THORPE 2788.
PA. CONsr. art. 9, § 13 (1790), 5 THORPE 3101: "nor cruel punishments inflicted."
S.C. CONsr. art. 9, § 4 (1790), 6 THORPE 3264: "nor cruel punishments inflicted."
VA. CONsT., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 9 (1776), 7 THORPE 3813.
38 N.H. CONST. § 18 (1784), 4 THORPE 2456: "All penalties ought to be proportioned
to the nature of the offense."
S.C. CONsT. § 40 (1778), 6 THORPE 3257, directed the legislature to reform the penal
code so that punishments might be made "less sanguinary, and in general more pro-
portionate to the crime."
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Although individual liberties were left unprotected by the Articles
of Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 did provide such
guarantees for the citizens of the Northwest Territory and included
within its provisions a prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.3 9
The failure of the proposed federal Constitution of 1787 to in-
clude a bill of rights prompted the well-known debates in the state
ratifying conventions. New York,40 Virginia41 and North Carolina,42
where sentiment expressing desire for the inclusion of a bill of rights
was the strongest, submitted proposals for such a bill which included
prohibitions of cruel and unusual punishment.4 3
In the Massachusetts ratifying convention, one delegate expressed
his desire to see a cruel and unusual punishment clause included within
the Constitution:
They [Congress] are no where restrained from inventing the
most cruel and unheard of punishments, and annexing them to
crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that
racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of
their discipline 44
In the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry warned of the dangers
of adopting a constitution without a cruel and unusual punishment
clause to restrain the legislature:
But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left,
nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives. 4 5
The eighth amendment occasioned very little discussion in Con-
gress prior to its adoption, and that only in the House. Congressman
Smith of South Carolina characterized the amendment as indefinite
and Congressman Livermore of New Hampshire speculated that the
Congress might be hamstrung by the amendment in the setting of
proper punishments for crime.46
39 Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, The Confederate
Congress, July 13, 1787; art. II: "All fines shall be moderate; and no cruel or unusual
punishments shall be inflicted." 1 U.S.C. at 23 (1971).
401 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 329 (2d ed. 1863) [hereinafter ELLIoT's DEBATES].
41 See 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES 593-96, 612-13, 622-31, 649-52.
42 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 242.
43 1 ELLIOT'S DEATES 328 (New York), 3 id. at 658 (Virginia), 4 id. at 244 (North
Carolina).
442 ELLIoT's DEBATES 111; 2 B. ScmvARTz, THE BILL OF RIGIITS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 690-91 (1971).
45 ELLoT's DEBATES 447-48. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
Compare Henry's theory with that of Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania, at id.
46 Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, objected to the words 'nor cruel and unusual
punishments', their import being too indefinite.
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DEVELOPMENT OF AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
Since the passage of the eighth amendment, the Court has allowed
the concept of cruel and unusual punishment to remain largely un-
developed. Although the Justices have struck down various penalties as
violative of the clause 47 and have upheld others,48 it is undeniably true
that "the exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual'
has not been detailed by th[e] Court."49
In the search for a relevant eighth amendment standard, the ques-
tion of separation of powers is necessarily encountered. What are the
proper roles of the legislatures and the Court in the determination of
the parameters of the cruel and unusual punishment clause? Upon
which branch is a definition of the clause promulgated by another
branch binding?
The answers given to these inquiries have frequently been framed
in absolute terms. Some have vigorously asserted that punishment
policy, especially that concerning the abolition or retention of capital
Mr. Livermore: 'The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on
which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it,
I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are
to be the judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to
determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes
necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having
their ears cut off; but are we in the future to be prevented from inflicting these
punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice
and deterring others from the commission of it would be invented, it would be
very prudent to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done,
we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of
this kind.'
The question was put on the clause, and it was agreed to by a considerable
majority.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789). Interestingly, Mr. Livermore seems to have correctly fore-
seen that the cruel and unusual punishment clause might be used to bar capital punish-
ment.
47 Robinson v. California, 870 U.S. 660 (1962) (imprisonment for narcotics addiction);
Trop v. Dulles, 856 U.S. 86 (1958) (denationalization for wartime desertion); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 849 (1910) (cadena temporal for falsifying a government document).
Robinson marks the sole occasion that five Justices have agreed that a particular
punishment violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause. In Trop, the opinion was
joined in by three other Justices; Justice Brennan concurred separately. A four Justice
majority produced the Weems decision.
48 Powell v. Texas, 892 U.S. 514 (1968) (fine imposed on a chronic alcoholic for public
drunkenness); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 US. 72 (1959) (confinement for contempt); Donald-
son v. Read Magazine, Inc., 383 U.S. 178 (1948) (issuance of mail fraud orders); Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (second electrocution after mechanical
failure of electric chair); Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 891 (1916) (imprisonment and
fine for each count of a multi-count conviction); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616
(1912) (heavier sentence for subsequent convictions); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 828 (1892)
(imprisonment and fine for each count of a multi-count conviction); McElvaine v. Brush,
142 U.S. 155 (1891) (solitary confinement); In re Kemmler, 186 U.S. 486 (1890) (electro-
cution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (shooting); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 745 (1866) (hard labor).
'9 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.). See
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punishment, is properly a political" or social5 1 issue, while others have
maintained that the ultimate proposition is one of law.52
That the state has broad discretion in determining the proper
punishment for crime is not open to serious dispute.53 A legislative
body is, however, bound to observe the guarantees of individual liberty
enumerated in the Constitution.54 In setting punishment standards,
therefore, the state may not violate the proscription of cruel and un-
usual punishment contained in the eighth amendment.
The essence of the argument that punishment policy, especially
that relating to capital punishment, is but a political or social issue is
the belief that the eighth amendment is directed to the legislature as a
sanction against the enactment of only the most barbaric and cruelly
excessive punishments condemned at the time of its passage.55 But if
this were so, the cruel and unusual punishment clause would be little
more than an empty promise, for no state would conceivably consider
reinstituting disembowelment or crucifixion as punishment for any
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370, 375 (1910); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
50 See Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 788 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942
(1972); N.Y. Times, July 6, 1968, at 42, col. 1 (statement of former Chief Justice Warren).
The Court has offered guidelines to aid in the determination of whether an issue is
political:
In determining whether a question falls within the political question cate-
gory, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality
to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria
for a judicial determination are dominant.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939).
Adequate standards do exist to measure whether a punishment falls within the prohi-
bition of the eighth amendment; see text accompanying notes 103, 106, 112 and 117, infra.
The Court retains the power to make the ultimate determination; see text accompanying
note 59, infra; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
51 Christian Science Monitor, January 27, 1972, § 2, at 1, col. 4.
52 Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 US. 660, 682-83 (1962) (Clark, J. dissenting); id. at
689 (White J., dissenting); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 384 (1910) (White, J., dis-
senting).
55 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 195 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 US.
235, 241 (1970); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren,
C.J.); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910).
54 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 113 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring).
55 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371, 376 (1910); Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1081 (1964). But see West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
The proposition has been extended to encompass the contention that if the penalty
falls within the limits set by the legislature, it is not cruel and unusual. See, e.g., Weems
v. United States, supra at 375; Schultz v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1934); Jones v.
State, 247 Md. 530, 233 A.2d 791 (1967); State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 581, 190 A.2d 514 (1963).
See also cases collected in Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal
of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846, 852 n.38 (1961) [hereinafter
Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment].
For an early rejoinder to this contention see O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 370-71
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
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crime. 6 This realization does not, however, destroy the present day
relevancy of the amendment. The state must be restrained from enact-
ing cruel and unusual punishments in addition to those of an obviously
barbaric nature.57
A legislator's allegiance is pledged to his conscience and his consti-
tuency, neither of which might quail at a statute inflicting a cruelly
excessive punishment on a member of a small, unpopular minority,
especially if the legislator were required only to acquiesce in the utiliza-
tion of a law long on the books but seldom (and then only arbitrarily)
enforced. 8 It is in precisely such a situation that a court is most clearly
called on to enforce the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.59
In order to do so, the court must ascertain the meaning and scope
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause.60 It can neither leave this
duty to the state nor shirk the responsibility to decide- the ultimate
constitutional question.6'
The Constitutional Concept of Cruelty
The failure of the Supreme Court to present a meaningful analysis
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, a failure left uncorrected
by Furman, is due largely to the difficulty of defining with precision
the terms "cruel" and "unusual."6' 2 There is little doubt 3 that the con-
stitutional proscription of cruelty forbids all historical forms of tor-
G6 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910).
57 Powell v. Texas, 592 U.S. 514, 566 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting); Robinson v.
California, 370 US. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103-04 (1958) (plurality
opinion of Warren, C.J.); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366, 372-73, 378-79, 382
(1910); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 US. 942 (1972).
See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890) (dictum); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
133, 136-37 (1879) (dictum).
58 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 375 (1910):
The abuse of power might, indeed, be apprehended, but not that it would be
manifested in provisions or practices which would shock the sensibilities of men.
G9 Id. at 378 ('our legal duty ... is invoked'); see also In re Kemmler, 136 US. 436,
446-47 (1890) ("it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge').
60 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d
628, 640, 493 P.2d 880, 888, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 160, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
Representative Livermore intimated this clearly in arguing against the amendment:
"It lays with the court to decide .... 1 ANNALS or CONG. 754 (1789).
61 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, CJ.); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 US. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 640-41, 493
P.2d 877, 888, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 159-60, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
62Trop v. Dulles, 856 US. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.);
Weems v. United States, 217 US. 349, 868-69 (1910). See Effectiveness of the Eighth Amend-
ment, supra note 55; Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-
Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. Ray. 996 (1964) [hereinafter Re-
vival of the Eighth Amendment]; 5 U. RxcsmroND L. R.v. 892, 393 (1971).
63 See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); but see State v. Cannon, 55
Del. 585, 190 A.2d 514 (1963) (upholding whipping); R. CALXwmm, Ra HANNAH (1947).
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ture,64 whether outright barbarity or inhumane treatment. The Court
has specifically condemned such inherently cruel practices as the inflic-
tion of a lingering death, 65 burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking
on the wheel,6  mutilation6 7 use of the rack and thumbscrew,68 and
similar atrocities perpetrated in the past. 69 However, the infliction of
physical pain as a necessary adjunct to execution was not thought to be
included within the amendment's scope.70
The amendment's limitation upon state power is not confined to
bodily torture. Also violative of the clause prohibiting cruelty are those
punishments which inflict pain primarily psychological in nature.
While the Court was slow in recognizing this concept 71 it was eventu-
ally held that under certain circumstances a particular form of punish-
ment could "subject the individual to a fate of ever increasing fear and
distress" 72 and that this "psychological hurt ... must be reckoned a
substantial factor in the ultimate judgment"73 of whether the punish-
ment violates the eighth amendment.
The scope of the constitutional prohibition of cruelty is not lim-
ited to the physical or mental suffering inhering in the penalty itself
or attending its mode of execution. The amendment is also concerned
with those punishments which are cruelly excessive, i.e., those which
are wholly disproportionate to the crime for which they are exacted.
This doctrine of excessiveness was first proposed in the Court by
Justice Field, dissenting in O'Neil v. Vermont:74
The inhibition [of the eighth amendment] is directed, not only
against punishments of the character mentioned [torture], but
against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity
are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. 75
64 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
65 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
06 Id. at 446.
67 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
68 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962); Chambers v. Florida, 309 US. 227,
237 (1940).
69 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910).
70 The Court has characterized pain as cruelty; see id. at 366. But this dictum was dis-
tinguished in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 US. 459, 463-64 (1947) (only "un-
necessary" pain condemned); cf. id. at 473 (Burton, J., dissenting) ('unnecessarily" cruel
means). This concept finds its origins in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 US. 130, 136 (1878)
("and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty').
71 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 US. 459, 464 (1947).
72 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.).
73 Id. at 111 (Brennan, J., concurring).
74 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
75 Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting). For an earlier view of Justice Field's eighth
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It is against excessive severity of the punishment as applied to
the offenses for which it is inflicted, that the inhibition is directed.76
Justice Field was, of course, treading on less than solid ground
when he offered this explanation of cruelty in the constitutional sense,
for it had long been recognized that the state has the widest possible
latitude in determining the limits of punishment.
In Weems v. United States,7 7 the Court had occasion to review a
sentence imposed in the Philippines. The Philippine constitution con-
tained the same prohibition of cruelty found in the eighth amendment.
The penalty involved was cadena temporal,78 imposed for the crime of
falsifying entries in a government cash book. Justice McKenna, reacting
with "wonder" at the severity of the punishment, reiterated the Field
doctrine:
Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed
their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citi-
zens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and be-
lieve that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.79
The Field-Weems excessiveness doctrine, however, did not live up
to its potential, possibly because Justice McKenna relied too heavily
on the fact that cadena was outrageously excessive in comparison to
punishments meted out for similar offenses in the United States. 0 In
Badders v. United States,8s the Court, emphasizing the primacy of the
legislature in the determination of the proper punishment for a given
crime, obliquely repudiated the Field-Weems doctrine of excessiveness
by citing the precedent of Howard v. Fleming,s2 which cautioned
against such judicial trespassing in the province of the legislature.
It is also conceivable that the concept of excessiveness as developed
amendment philosophy, see Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Gas. 252 (No. 6546) (C.C.D. Cal.
1879).
76 144 U.S. at 364.
77217 U.S. 349 (1910). Weems is a landmark case for it is the first instance in which
the Court invalidated a penalty prescribed by a legislature for a particular offense.
78 The cadena temporal consisted of the following:
a) 12 years and 1 day to 20 years imprisonment at hard labor carrying chains at
wrist and ankle;
b) civil interdiction;
c) subjection to surveillance for life; and
d) perpetual absolute disqualification from the exercise of civil rights.
See id. at 364-65.
79 Id. at 366-67. See also H. KNIGHT, WIrH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 208-09 (1967);
Tingler, Unconstitutional Punishment, 6 Caim. L. Bur.. 311 (1970).
80 See Wgeems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
81240 U.S. 391 (1916).
82 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903): "Undue leniency in one case does not transform a reason-
able punishment in another case to a cruel one."
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in Weems was adulterated by the addition of the inherently cruel fea-
tures of the cadena to the grounds of condemnation.8 Whatever the
case, the excessiveness doctrine was kept alive largely through the ve-
hicles of dissent"4 and concurrence 5 until the present time. However,
the concept of disproportionate punishment as excessive cruelty retains
its validity under certain circumstances. As Justice Douglas has pointed
out:
A punishment all out of proportion to the offense may bring
it within the ban against 'cruel and unusual punishment.' ... The
principle that would deny power to exact capital punishment for
a petty crime would also deny power to punish a person by fine or
imprisonment for being sick.86
Such a punishment would serve no legitimate purpose, and would
clearly fall under the amendment's ban.
The Test for Cruelty
Once the meaning of the constitutional concept of cruelty has been
determined, the proper standards by which a particular punishment
can be adjudged cruel remain to be developed.
Inherent Cruelty
Inherent cruelty is not a static concept. The Court has recognized
that the relevant eighth amendment standard is "progressive, and not
fastened to the obsolete,"87 for the "provisions of the Constitution are
83 "[E]ven the cruelty of pain is not omitted." 217 U.S. at 366. See Revival of the
Eighth Amendment, supra note 62, at 1007.
84 See, e.g., Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting
from a denial of cert.); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 435 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his Lambert dissent, Justice Frank-
furter stated the case:
Then, too, a cruelly disproportionate relation between what the law requires
and the sanction for its disobedience may constitute a violation of the Eighth
Amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment....
85 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 105 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 556 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Concurring in Trop, Mr. Justice Brennan, whose vote was necessary for a majority,
denied the legislature the power to "adopt any measure at all to demonstrate its displeasure
and exact its penalty from the offender against its laws." Trop v. Dulles, supra at 113.
He also pointed out the harshness of the punishment imposed in this case. Id. at 110.
Torture or the like was not at issue.
86 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962). See Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d
786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972), in which the death penalty was stricken
down as excessive punishment for the crime of rape where the victim received no sub-
stantial bodily injury.
Blackstone's commentary also loses none of its validity today; see note 30 supra.
87 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
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not time worn adages or hollow shibboleths. They are vital living prin-
ciples .... ,,88 The scope of the amendment is not limited to those
atrocities committed in years long past or solely to those condemned
by the Founders but is applicable to new conditions and purposes s9
for "a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth."90 The cruel and unusual punishment
clause must therefore draw its meaning from "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."91
Since the Court has indicated that the key to the meaning of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause is contained in the standards of
society, it becomes imperative that some method of gauging this senti-
ment be developed. The difficulty of such a task is demonstrated by the
various approaches used to determine valid indicia of community atti-
tudes toward punishment policy.
For example, in an effort to substitute objectivity for personal
revulsion at the imposition of certain penalties,92 judges have often
utilized a "shock the conscience" test to arrive at a conclusion of
cruelty.93 This method is, however, susceptible to the criticism that
judges who use it are, in reality, only brushing a thin coat of univer-
sality over what is essentially a personal gut reaction.
9 4
Another approach looks to the historic usage of a particular pun-
ishment to determine its compatibility with the prevailing standards
of society.95 Such a conceptualization contradicts the evolving nature
SSTrop v. Dulles, 556 U.S. 86, 103 (1957) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.). See
Ralph v. Warden, 488 U.S. 786, 790 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972);
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 647, 493 P.2d 880, 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 165, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
89 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 49 (1910).
90 Id. at 373.
91 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.).
92 See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 829 U.S. 459, 478 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
03 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 473 (1947) (Burton, J.,
dissenting) ("shocks the most fundamental instincts of civilized men'); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 375 (1910) ("shock the sensibilities of men'); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
US. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) ("it is hard to believe that any man of right
feeling and heart can refrain from shuddering'); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957) ("shocking to the sense of justice'); State v. Teague,
215 Ore. 609, 611, 836 P.2d 38, 340 (1959) (per curiam) ("shock the moral senses of all
reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances'); State v. Evans,
73 Idaho 50, 58, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (1952) ('shock the conscience of reasonable men');
People v. Morris, 80 Mich. 634, 639, 45 N.W. 591, 592 (1890) C'shock the moral sense of the
people').
94See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 179 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470-71 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). Witness also the fact that there are often "reasonable men" who dissent from such
a finding.
95 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 133 (1878).
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of the amendment. Punishments thought perfectly compatible with the
standards of eighteenth century American society would meet wide-
spread repugnance todayY6
This was recognized in Weems, Trop v. Dulles and Robinson v.
California, where the Court struck down punishments (cadena, de-
nationalization, and imprisonment for narcotics addiction) previously
justified by historical usage.
A third method utilizes comparative reference to the statutes of
other jurisdictions to determine the acceptability of the punishments
under review. In Weems, the Philippine cadena temporal was com-
pared to United States penalties for the same offense9 7 and, in Trop,
denationalization was found to be a rare punishment within the com-
munity of civilized nations.98 This approach is, of course, susceptible
to the Badders criticism as well as to the observation that some mem-
bers of the "civilized" world have only recently, if at all, abandoned
torture as an instrument of repression. 00
Raw public opinion, as measured through the use of polls, yields
at best a highly suspect picture of the attitude of the community toward
punishment policy.Y0 1 Public acquiescence in the imposition of a par-
ticular punishment may bear no relation to its constitutionality.10 2
The Court has said that the type of public opinion which must be
utilized in determining prevalent community attitudes is that which
has become "enlightened by a humane justice.' 03 It is this "enlight-
ened" public opinion which reveals the standard of decency against
which a punishment suspect as inherently cruel must be measured. A
reasonable assumption is that the body of enlightened opinion is most
validly reflected by those segments of society that are knowledgeable
of the subject. The opinions of legislators, jurors, penologists, crimi-
96 For a comprehensive compilation of punishment statutes in effect during the period,
see Brief for Petitioner, Aikens v. California, No. 68-5027, at app. C, cert. dismissed, 408
U.S. 813 (1972).
The early commentators realized that the clause would be unnecessary if read only to
forbid barbarities prevalent during the past. See, e.g., 2 J. STORY, CoMmENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1903 at 650 (5th ed. 1891).
97 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910).
98Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.).
99 See text accompanying note 81, supra.
100 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 25, 1972, at 3, col. 1 (torture used for political repression
in Argentina).
101 Community sentiment is usually too amorphous to be determined by simple poll-
ing methods. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 838 (1952).
102 See Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942
(1972): "Public awareness diminishes as the frequency of imposing the penalty de-
creases .... 1
103 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
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nologists, psychologists, sociologists, and jurists, as well as informed
members of the population at large should, therefore, be consulted to
determine prevailing community standards.10
The Weems-Trop test of inherent cruelty, that a punishment is
inherently cruel which violates the evolving standards of decency as
measured by informed public opinion, must be supplemented by a
vital corollary. Speaking for the Trop plurality, Chief Justice Warren
declared, "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man."'1°5 Once it is seen that the
dominant effect of inherently cruel punishment is not the infliction of
pain and suffering but the degradation and dehumanization of victim
and spectator, 00 then it should be clear that inherently cruel punish-
ments involve a denial of the dignity of the individual and must also
fall under the constitutional condemnation of the eighth amendment.
Excessive Cruelty
A cruelly excessive punishment cannot be measured by the same
standard utilized to determine inherent cruelty. A violation of the
eighth amendment by the former is usually a more subtle and difficult
proposition to evaluate. Justice Brennan, concurring in Trop v.
Dulles,07 opened one possible avenue of approach:
Clearly the severity of the penalty, in the case of a serious of-
fense, is not enough to invalidate it where the nature of the penalty
is rationally directed to achieve the legitimate ends of punish-
ment.
08
The traditional ends of punishment have been characterized as
retribution, deterrence, reform and isolation for the protection of the
community. 09 If the interest of the state in imposing a particular pun-
'04 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). The contemporary human
knowledge referred to in this comment is surely that of an "enlightened" body of opinion.
See also Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1947) (Frank, J., dissenting)
("attitude of our ethical leaders'); Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HAav. L. REv. 1773, 1783 (1970) [hereinafter Goldberg & Dershowitz].
105 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.).
106 There is no doubt that severe corporal punishment brutalizes not only the
victim but the person who executes the punishment and the spectators, awaken-
ing sadistic tendencies and demoralizing the finer sensibilities.
4 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 413 (1931). See Revival of the Eighth Amendment, supra note 62, at
1000.
107 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
108 Id. at III (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
109 See, e.g., Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting
from a denial of cert.); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111-12 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 600 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting). See also
0. HoLMes, Tim COMMON LAw 36 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
Punishment for the sole purpose of retribution is no longer regarded as legitimate
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ishment is illegitimate,'" or is demonstrably unnecessary to justify the
punishment imposed,"' it is cruelly excessive in violation of the eighth
amendment." 2 Such a standard condemns both the infliction of a
grossly disproportionate punishment as well as one which would serve
no legitimate purpose of the state.
The Constitutional Concept of Unusualness
The imprecision of the concept of cruelty in the constitutional
sense is more than matched by the vagueness of the term "unusual."
Once again, the Court has provided few guidelines to aid in distinguish-
ing the two prohibitions of the clause. In Trop v. Dulles,"3 Chief
Justice Warren commented on this problem:
Whether the word "unusual" has any qualitative meaning dif-
ferent from "cruel" is not clear. On the few occasions this Court
has had to consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions
between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn.
[T]he Court simply examines the particular punishment involved
in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment,
without regard to any subtleties of meaning that might be latent
in the word "unusual."" 14
The Chief Justice concluded that if the word "unusual" is to have
an independent constitutional meaning, it should be "the ordinary
one, signifying something different from that which is usually done."115
exercise of legislative power. See Trop v. Dulles, supra at 113; Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 248 (1949); In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 745, 408 P.2d 948, 951, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172,
175 (1965); People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 134 N.E.2d 197, 202, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373
(1956). See also ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1954, REPORT 17 (H.M.S.O.
1953) [hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION]; STATE OF FLORIDA, SPECIAL COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CAPITAL CASES, REPORT 23 (1965);
MAsS. REPORT, supra note 34, at 34-37; 0. HOLMES, supra at 37; A. KOESTLER, REFLEcTIONS
ON HANGING 105 (1957); J. MIcHArL & H. WacCsLER (eds.), CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS AxmiN-
ISTRATION 9-10 (1940); Marcus & Weisbrodt, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
1268, 1348-54 (1968).
110 E.g., political repression or retribution alone.
111 See W. BRADFORD, AN ENQUIRY How FAX THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS NECESSARY IN
PENNSYLVANIA (1793), reprinted in 12 Am. J. LEG. Hist. 122, 127 (1968).
112 See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) ("the punish-
ment was greatly beyond anything required by any humane law for the offenses'). The
fact that a punishment might be deemed to be necessary does not permit it to be in-
flicted despite the fact that it is inherently cruel.
113 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
114 Id. at 100 n.32 (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.) (citations omitted); see Jackson
v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968). But cf. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 430 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890).
115 356 U.S. at 100-01 n.32. Certainly the term could not mean "novel" for this in-
terpretation would effectively prevent the introduction of punishment that might prove
beneficial to the convict. See In re Candido, 31 Hawaii 982, 992 (1931); see also In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding the novel punishment of electrocution).
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A penalty should therefore be considered constitutionally suspect as
unusual if it is rarely or infrequently imposed.
The basis for this suspect treatment is that a punishment which
is exacted in only a small minority of cases is susceptible of arbitrary
or discriminatory imposition.'10 The public is more inclined to
tolerate a punishment rarely and infrequently imposed and the legisla-
ture will consequently feel little pressure to eliminate laws which do
not excite the common displeasure. Discriminatory application of pun-
ishment actually aids in the suppression of public outrage for it is an
easy matter to acquiesce in the punishment of a member of a small,
unpopular minority, especially when the application is coincident with
one's personal prejudices. History offers many instances in which a
colonial population, small in size and far from the mother country, has
suffered under oppressive taxation policies imposed by the representa-
tives of a distant majority. Thus, arbitrary or discriminatory applica-
tion of the law is precisely what is prohibited by the eighth amendment
term "unusual."
The word assumes an even fuller meaning when considered in the
context of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
eighth amendment was held fully applicable to the states through the
vehicle of the fourteenth amendment in the 1962 case, Robinson v.
California.117 In the administration of criminal justice, the fourteenth
It has been suggested that the term can be understood as an adverbial modifier of
cruel, i.e., unusually cruel punishment; see Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 635, 639 (1966); Effectiveness
of the Eighth Amendment, supra note 55, at 849-50; Bedau, The Courts, The Constitution
and Capital Punishment, 1968 UrrAH L. REv. 201, 231. This analysis has considerable merit
and leads to the ultimate conclusion that the clause prohibits excessive punishment.
The Supreme Court of California has found that "excessive" or "disproportionate"
punishment is unusual; see People v. Oppenheimer, 156 Cal. 733, 106 P. 74 (1909); but see
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 654, 493 P.2d 877, 897, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 169, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). Excessiveness, however, relates to the proportionality between
the penalty and the crime and the justification for its infliction, while unusualness is
primarily concerned with the frequency of its imposition and the identity of the individ-
uals upon whom the penalty is imposed.
In the words of Afr. Justice Brennan:
The question, in any event, is of minor significance; this Court has never at-
tempted to explicate the meaning of the Clause by simply parsing its words.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 276 n.20 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
116 Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 104, at 1790.
117 370 US. 660 (1962). There can be little doubt that this Bill of Rights guarantee,
whose "basic concept ... is nothing less than the dignity of man" (Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.)), satisfies the most restrictive test
for adoption as a measure of due process. Its derivation from times anterior to Magna
Carta, through the Bill of Rights of 1689, amply establishes that it is a "'principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental."' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resveber, 329 U.. 459, 463 (1947).
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amendment forbids arbitrariness and discrimination and "requires
that no different or higher punishment shall be imposed upon one
than is imposed upon all for like offenses." 118
THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Until June of this year, the Supreme Court had considered eighth
amendment claims relating only to methods of imposing the death
penalty. The constitutionality of the penalty itself was never expressly
approved or disapproved although the Court assumed its validity sub
silentio in the course of affirming particular methods of execution.
Tacit approval of capital punishment was expressed in more recent
cases.
Wilkerson v. Utah"9 provides an example of this assumption of
constitutionality. At a time when the eighth amendment had not yet
been applied to the states, the Court unanimously sustained death by
shooting, finding it to be a common historical method of execution in
the Utah territory. Twelve years later the Court approved the new
method of electrocution in the case of In re Kemmler, 20 although re-
affirming that the eighth amendment did not apply to the states. The
Court pronounced the following dictum:
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a linger-
ing death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life.' 21
The method of imposing the death penalty was not challenged on
eighth amendment grounds for the next 57 years until Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber,'22 where the Court was faced with a challenge to
a second electrocution after the first attempt had failed due to mechan-
ical malfunction of the electric chair. Again the constitutionality of
the death penalty was assumed by the Court:
The incorporation achieved in Robinson was subsequently reaffirmed in Gideon v.
Wainwright:
The Court has made obligatory on the States ... the Eighth's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.
372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963). See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 n.6 (1964).
118In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 486, 449 (1890). This applies only to the legislature in
setting the statutory penalties for crime; within the specified limits set, judges and juries
can determine the proper individual sentence. But see text accompanying notes 181, 187,
infra.
119 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
120 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
121 Id. at 446-47.
122 829 U.S. 459 (1947).
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The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a con-
victed man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not
the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to ex-
tinguish life humanely. -3
In 1958, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a plurality of the
Court in Trop v. Dulles,12 4 gratuitously applied the "evolving stan-
dards" criteria to the death penalty in an often-quoted dictum:
Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment,
both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purpose
of punishment- and they are forceful- the death penalty has
been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is
still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty. 25
While chipping away at the death penalty by surrounding its im-
position with numerous procedural safeguards,"26 the Court in the
past steadfastly refused to review its constitutionality by denying cer-
tiorari,127 by limiting certiorari to non-eighth amendment issues128 and
by deciding cases without reference to the eighth amendment ques-
tion.12 9
The road to reversal of this time-honored position was precipi-
tously short but marked by two significant decisions. In 1970, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared that capital punishment for
the crime of rape, where the victim suffered no serious bodily injury,
was unconstitutional as cruelly excessive in violation of the eighth
amendment. 30 And, earlier this year, the Supreme Court of California
struck down state capital punishment statutes as cruel and unusual in
123 Id. at 464.
124 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
125 Id. at 99 (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.).
126 See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510 (1968); Powell v. Alabama, 287
US. 45 (1932).
127 See, e.g., Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 US. 889 (1963).
128 See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
US. 510 (1968). In McGautha, Justice Black offered the following observation:
The Eighth Amendment forbids 'cruel and unusual punishments.' In my
view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that
penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in countries from
which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is incon-
ceivable to me that the Framers intended to end capital punishment by the
Amendment.
402 US. at 226 (concurring opinion). Other punishments known to the Framers and ap-
proved as penalties at that time were whipping and earcropping; see note 46 supra.
129 See, e.g., Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 US. 948 (1971); Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 239 (1969). Cf. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
398 US. 262 (1970).
I80 Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 US. 942 (1972).
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violation of the California Constitution.' 31 The United States Supreme
Court had by this time finally agreed to decide the question whether
capital punishment was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments.132 0 On June 29, 1972 the Court rendered
its decision in Furman v. Georgia; each of the Justices presented a
separate opinion indicating his position on the constitutionality of the
death penalty.
The Furman Opinions
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring
Mr. Justice Douglas condemns the death penalty in those cases
where its imposition is discretionary but does not decide whether a
mandatory death sentence would also violate the eighth amendment.
This is a result of his overriding concern with the constitutionality of
capital punishment as viewed in light of the eighth amendment pro-
hibition of "unusual" punishment. Emphasizing that one of the indicia
of unusualness is discrimination in the application of a particular
punishment, Mr. Justice Douglas states the following test: a punish-
ment is proscribed as "unusual" in violation of the eighth amendment
if it
discriminated against [a defendant] by reason of his race, religion,
wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a proce-
dure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.133
The opinion is thus strongly oriented toward the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause, which Justice Douglas declares
to be implicit in the cruel and unusual prohibition of the eighth
amendment 3 4 This approach necessitates an inquiry into the identity
of those who are executed in the country. Justice Douglas maintains
that it is the poor, the powerless and the minority group members who
are isolated for imposition of the death penalty. 13 5 This contention is
supported by the personal observations of those familiar with the execu-
tion process. Former Governor Michael Di Salle of Ohio described his
contacts with the death penalty thusly:
131 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied,
406 U.S. 958 (1972).
132 Aikens v. California, Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas, cert.
granted, 403 U.S. 952 (1971). Certiorari was dismissed in Aikens, see note 2 supra.
133 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 257.
135 But the Leopolds and the Loebs, the Harry Thaws, the Dr. Sheppards and the
Dr. Finchs of our society are never executed, only those in the lower strata, only
those who are members of an unpopular minority or poor and despised.
Id. at 247 n.10.
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During my experience as Governor of Ohio, I found the men
in death row had one thing in common; they were penniless ...
the fact that they had no money was a principal factor in their be-
ing condemned to death.136
Official studies of capital offenders indicate that
there is evidence that the imposition of the death sentence and the
exercise of dispensing power by the courts and the executive
follow discriminatory patterns. The death sentence is dispropor-
tionately imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the
members of unpopular groups. 37
Racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty is a
matter difficult to prove. The raw execution figures establish only that,
since 1930, more blacks than whites have been executed. 38 However,
no reliable statistics breaking down death sentence figures according
to race are available for the post-1930 period. Variables, such as the
heinousness of the crime and the skill of the accused's counsel, cannot
be held constant to insure a valid statistical comparison. The figures for
rape do, however, indicate a vast disproportionality between the execu-
tions of blacks and whites during this time period. All but one of the
states retaining the death penalty for rape are southern or border
states.'8 9 It should be noted that, during the four decades for which
figures are available, many procedural safeguards against discriminatory
application of the death penalty have been instituted and the social
attitudes of jurors may have undergone significant changes. The alle-
gation of discrimination is buttressed by studies of racial and socioeco-
nomic characteristics of offenders sentenced to death locally40 and
136Hearings on S. 1760 before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 11 (1970) [hereinafter
Hearings]. See id. at 25 for the statement of Warden Clinton Duffy of San Quentin that
capital punishment is a "privilege of the poor." But cf. B. PRErIYmAN, DEATH AND THE
SuFmEm COURT 296-97 (1961).
137 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
REPORT (THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY) 143 (1967) [hereinafter PPESMENT's
CoMmSION]. See also PENNSYLVANIA JOINT LEaosLATrlv CoMMrrrEE ON CAPrrAL PUNISH-
MzENT, REPORT 14-15 (1961).
18S All Offenses Murder Rape
Total White Negro Total White Negro Total White Negro
1930-1972 3,859 1,751 2,066 3,334 1,664 1,630 455 48 405
Percent 100.0 45.4 53.5 100.0 49.9 48.9 100.0 10.5 89.0
U.S., DEPARTmENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS,
CAPITAL PumSmHENT 1930-1970 at 8 (1971) [hereinafter N.P.S.]. "Other" racial and crime
classifications have been omitted.
'39 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 391 n.14 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 US. 942 (1972).
140 See, e.g., Bedau, Capital Punishment in Oregon, 1903-1964, 45 ORE. L. REv. 1
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nationally.141 While these studies are by no means conclusive, the in-
ference can certainly be drawn that discrimination constitutes a rele-
vant factor in the determination of who shall be executed.
Mr. Justice Douglas cites the discretionary system of sentencing as
the primary cause enabling discrimination to affect the imposition of
the death penalty. He states that the
high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual" punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write
penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary
and require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied
sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.142
While the laws regarding discretionary sentencing are nondiscrimina-
tory on their face, they may be applied in such a way as to violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment which, in Mr.
Justice Douglas' view, is implicit in the ban on "cruel and unusual
punishments."'143 Thus he condemns the death sentences in these cases
as unconstitutional but does not decide whether a mandatory death
sentence would also violate the eighth amendment.
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring
Mr. Justice Brennan presents a comprehensive indictment of the
death penalty per se as cruel and unusual punishment. He offers four
distinct but interrelated principles to aid in the determination of
whether a punishment falls within the amendment's ban. 44
(1965); Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey, 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L. Ry. 1 (1964);
Carter & Smith, The Death Penalty in California: A Statistical and Composite Portrait,
15 CaiME & DELINQ. 62 (1969); Koeniger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924-1968 15
CRIME & DELiNQ. 132 (1969).
141 See, e.g., R. CLARK, CaMsE iN AmERICA 335 (1970); M. WOLFGANG &c B. CoHEN, CRIMP
AND RACE: CONCEPTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 77, 80-81, 85-86 (1970); Johnson, The Negro
and Crime, 217 ANNALs 93, 95, 99 (1941); Johnson, Selective Factors in Capital Punish-
ment, 36 Soc. FORCES 165 (1957); Williams, The Death Penalty and the Negro, 67 Qusm
501, 511 (1960); Wolfgang, Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted Along Ad-
missions to Death Row, 53 J. Ciam. L.C. & P.S. 301 (1962).
142 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
143 Id. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
144 If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is
inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if
there is no reason to believe it serves any penal purpose more effectively than
some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment
violates the command of the clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and
uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan finds
the death penalty violative of each of these principles and his reasoning is similar to that
of Justices Douglas (arbitrariness: see text accompanying notes 133-135 supra) and Marshall
(rejection by society: see text accompanying notes 170-173 infra; unneccessary infliction:
see text accompanying notes 154-169).
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In Justice Brennan's view, the infliction of a particular punish-
ment is violative of the cruel and unusual punishment clause if by its
severity it is "degrading to human dignity."'145 He declares that this
principle is primary and that it "supplies the essential predicate" for
the application of the other standards. This concept finds precedent in
the opinion of Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles: "The basic
concept underlying the [clause] is nothing less than the dignity of
man."146
Justice Brennan feels that death is a unique punishment in the
United States147 because of its extreme severity, which is reflected in
the unusual pain, finality and enormity of the penalty. He condemns
death as inherently cruel, both physically and psychologically. While
the information is inconclusive, it appears that no available method
would guarantee an immediate and painless death. 4 Furthermore,
the psychological trauma inherent in the infliction of death is an in-
separable part of the process. 49
Death is the absolutely final punishment from which there is no
appeal. It may be said that, in contrast to the prisoner who still retains
the possibility of having his punishment reversed, the executed person
has truly lost the "right to have rights."'50 In summarizing his finding
that the death sentence is cruel and unusual per se, Mr. Justice Brennan
states:
145 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 258, 281 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
146 Trop v. Dulles, 856 US. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, CJ.).
147 Cf. Williams v. Georgia, 849 U.S. 875, 391 (1955); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156,
196 (1953); Andres v. United States, 338 U.S. 740, 752 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287 US.
45 (1932).
148 See Hearings, supra note 186, at 20 (hanging); id. at 21 (lethal gas); L. LAwEs,
IAFE AND DEATH IN SING SING 170-71 (1928) (electrocution); see generally Marcus & Weis-
brodt, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. R1 . 1268, 1839-41 (1968). But see R. ELLIoT,
AGENT oF DEATH (1940); N.Y. Times, February 25, 1965, at 20, col. 6 (death is "both
instantaneous and painless" by electrocution).
149 [r]he process of carrying out a verdict of death is so often so degrading and
brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture.
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P.2d 880, 894, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 166, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). See also Bluestone & McGehee, Reaction to Extreme Stress:
Impending Death by Execution, 119 AAr. J. PsYcMravTY 393 (1962); West, Medicine and
Capital Punishment, in Hearings, supra note 186, at 127; Note, Mental Suffering Under
Sentence of Death, 57 IowA L. R v. 814 (1972).
Air. Justice Frankfurter once noted that "the onset of insanity while awaiting exe-
cution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon." Solesbee v. Balkcom, 839 US. 9,
14 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
ftr. Justice Brennan rejects the justification that this is the result of the lengthy
waiting period brought on by the determination of the criminal himself to exhaust his
legal rights. He argues that it is society which demands that all legal avenues be explored
before execution is carried out. 408 U.S. at 289 n.37.
150 Trop v. Dulles, 356 US. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.).
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The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves,
by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity.' 51
Mr. Justice Marshall, concurring
In an exhaustive 62-page concurring opinion condemning capital
punishment as unconstitutional per se, Mr. Justice Marshall offers four
distinct reasons for finding that a given penalty is proscribed by the
cruel and unusual clause: inherent cruelty, i.e., torture, whether physi-
cal or psychological; 152 literal unusualness, signifying that the punish-
ment was previously unknown as a penalty for a given offence; 158 ex-
cessive cruelty; and abhorrence to currently existing moral values. If
the punishment meets any one of these criteria, it is repugnant to the
Constitution.
Reference to excessive or unnecessary cruelty invites an examina-
tion of whether the death penalty is necessary to meet the ends of pun-
ishment. 154 Justice Marshall examines the concept of retribution as
justification for the infliction of the death penalty and notes that
[t]he fact that the State may seek retribution against those who
have broken its laws does not mean that retribution may then be-
come the State's sole end in punishing. 5
Justice Marshall then rejects vengeance alone as a proper justification
for the infliction of the death penalty, citing historical'"6 and legal'52
151 Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
152 The inherent cruelty of the death penalty is discussed in the opinion of Justice
Brennan. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
153 Justice Marshall states that "if these punishments are intended to serve a humane
purpose, they may be constitutionally permissible." 408 U.S. at 331.
154 See text accompanying note 109. Consideration of the death penalty requires
modification of the traditional list. Rehabilitation is obviously rendered impossible by
execution. The necessity of retaining the death penalty to prevent recidivism is undercut
by the finding that capital offenders are the least likely to commit another crime after
parole; see, e.g., RoYAL COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 486-91; Stanton, Murderers on
Parole, 15 CIMEsi & DELiNQ. 149 (1969).
Mr. Justice Marshall adds to the traditional list the encouragement of guilty pleas
and confessions, eugenics and economy. The first, if utilized for the purpose of discouraging
the exercise of the accused's sixth amendment rights, is termed unconstitutional, citing
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). Justice Marshall dismisses eugenics as
"obviously meritless" and rejects the third contention, declaring that the costs of long
term imprisonment are more than outweighed by the expenditures involved in the exercise
of the full panoply of constitutional rights usually concomitant with a capital case. 408
U.S. at 355-58.
15r 408 U.S. at 343.
156 See, e.g., C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (H. Paolucci transl. 1963); PLxTo,
PROTAGORAS 211-12 (Modem Library ed. 1928):
[N]o one punishes the evildoers under the notion, or for the reason, that he
has done wrong,-only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But
he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong
which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the
man who is punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again.
157Justice Marshall cites Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910), stating
[Vol. 47:107
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
precedents. He acknowledges the proposition that society demands
vengeance to evidence its disapproval of the immorality of crime6 s but
rejects this approach as falling too near the limits set by the eighth
amendment.' 9
Justice Marshall then explores the deterrent function of capital
punishment in full detail. Describing death as the ultimate sanction
that society can apply,160 he frames the question as "not simply
whether capital punishment is a deterrent, but whether it is a better
deterrent than life imprisonment."'61 The claims that execution is an
effective deterrent to crime are depicted as largely hypothetical 62 or
based primarily on the impressionistic personal experiences of law
enforcement officials.163 Justice Marshall prefers to rely on the statistics
collected by Dr. Thorsten Sellin, one of the leading authorities on
capital punishment.' He found that no correlation existed be-
that the Court therein deemed retribution for its own sake impermissible by its omission
from its enumeration of the purposes of punishment. 408 U.S. at 344.
158 See 2 J. STEPHEN, HISToRY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAM 81-82 (1883):
I think it is highly desirable that criminals should be hated, that the punish-
ment inflicted on them should be so construed as to give expression to that hatred,
and to justify it so far as the public provision of means for expressing and grati-
fying a healthy natural sentiment can justify and encourage it.
See also Allen, Capital Punishment: Your Protection and Mine, in BEDAu, supra note 14,
at 138; Vallenga, Christianity and the Death Penalty, in id. at 129.
359 Certainly the eighth amendment prescribes the bounds of vengeance; if it
were not so, perhaps the rack might better express society's outrage at crime. See A.
KoEsrtTL, RmECnoNS ON HANGING 105-06 (1957):
The desire for vengeance has deep, unconscious roots and is roused when
we feel strong indignation .... Deep inside every man there lurks a tiny Stone
Age man ... screaming an eye for an eye. But we would rather not have that
little fur-clad figure dictate the law of the land.
160 But see Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, in BxoAu, supra note 14, at 154,
163; Hook, The Death Sentence, in id. at 152.
161 408 U.S. at 346-47. It has been asserted that no punishment is effective as a deterrent
to crime; see, e.g., K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 206-08 (1968).
162 See, e.g., ROYAL COMMIssION, supra note 109, at 19. This theoretical argument can
be offset by another, that there exist very few individuals who think rationally about
the consequences of being convicted of a capital crime before the act has been accom-
plished; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238, 301 (Brennan, J., concurring). Further,
there are certainly undeterrable crimes, i.e., those which no amount of punishment will
prevent. Common examples are crimes committed under the compulsion of extreme
psychological stress and those committed out of necessity (starving pickpockets plying their
trade at the hanging of their confreres).
163 See, e.g., BEDAu, supra note 14, at 267, for a representative case -robbery suspects
confessing to the police that they used simulated or unloaded weapons rather than chance
killing someone and thereby risking the death penalty. See also Desky, Should Capital
Punishment be Abolished in California, 39 THE COMMvEALTH 19, 23 (1963). Self-
interest renders this type of confession highly unreliable.
164408 U.S. at 348. Sellin, in his comprehensive analysis of the deterrent effect of
the death penalty, T. SEI.LIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959) [hereinafter SE.iN], advances,
inter alia, the hypotheses that if the death penalty deters prospective murderers, the
murder rate should be lower in retentionist than in comparative abolitionist states; that
murders should increase when the death penalty is abolished and decline when it is rein-
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tween the murder rate and the presence or absence of capital punish-
ment, 6 5 nor was there any evidence that the abolition and subsequent
reintroduction of the death penalty had any effect on the homicide
rates involved. 66 Furthermore, law enforcement officers were no safer
in those states which retained the death penalty than in abolitionist
states.167 Justice Marshall summarizes his statistical argument by quot-
ing a United Nations report on capital punishment:
[T]he data which now exist show no correlation between the
existence of capital punishment and lower rates of capital crime.168
Statistics are inconclusive as to the superiority of the death penalty
over life imprisonment as a deterrent to capital crime, but Justice
Marshall feels that they do show by clear and convincing evidence that
capital punishment is unnecessary to achieve this end. This conclusion
shifts the burden of proving the necessity of the death penalty to the
State,169 and, since it cannot do so, Justice Marshall condemns such a
stated; and that law enforcement officers would be safer in retentionist states than those
comparative states which have abolished the death penalty. Id. at 21.
165 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 350, apps. II-IlI (1972). (Marshall, J., concurring);
see also Reckless, The Use of the Death Penalty-A Factual Statement, 15 CRME &
DMNQ. 43 (1969).
166 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 350 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), citing SLuN,
supra note 164, at 35-38. See Cobin, Abolition and Restoration of the Death Penalty in
Delaware, in BEDAU, supra note 14, at 359, 362-63; Guinot, Abolition and Retention of the
Death Penalty in Missouri, in id., at 351, 358-59; Samuelson, The Effect of the Abolition
and Restoration of the Death Penalty in Delaware, in Hearings, supra note 136, at 112,
119. Delaware abolished the death penalty in 1958 and reinstated it in 1961; in Missouri
the dates were 1917 and 1919, respectively.
162 See SELIMN, supra note 164, at 56-58; Campion, Does the Death Penalty Protect
the State Police, in BEDAu, supra note 14, at 301-15; Sellin, Does the Death Penalty Protect
Municipal Police, in id., at 284-301.
Prison officials are also no safer in states which retain the death penalty; see MAss.
REPORT, supra note 34, at 21-22; Sellin, Homicides and Assaults in American Prisons, 31
ACrA CRIMINOLOGIAE Er MEDICINAE LEGALIs JAPoINCA 1939 (1965).
168 UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 119 (1968) [hereinafter U.N.].
The statistical picture is clouded by several problems. The assumption must be made
that the proportion of capital murders in a reporting jurisdiction remains reasonably
constant. This is necessitated by the fact that non-capital killings are included in the
homicide statistics, for there are no statistics available reflecting only capital murders.
Also, undetected murders are often reported as accidents or suicide or not at all. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 349-50 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Professor Sellin's statistics have been acknowledged as valid by both the United Nations,
U.N., supra at 117, and Great Britain, ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 349-51.
See Vold, Extent and Trend of Capital Crimes in the United States, 284 ANNAus 1, 4 (1952).
169 See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 104, at 1785 (1970):
The interest protected by the cruel and unusual punishment clause should
not be taken as any less central than those protected by these other provisions
of the Bill of Rights.
The authors argue for the adoption of the "compelling interest test" to force the State
to justify its imposition of the death penalty, rather than give the legislature the benefit of
the constitutional doubt. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618 (1969).
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punishment as cruelly excessive in violation of the eighth amendment.
Justice Marshall does not rest his case on these grounds alone. He
further declares that since the death penalty is morally unacceptable
to the people of the United States, it is therefore violative of the eighth
amendment. He acknowledges the difficulty of determining the proper
indicia of community sentiment17" but minimizes the value of the
public opinion poll as a gauge of whether capital punishment violates
the popular conscience.17' The proper standard, the Justice contends, is
Whether a substantial portion of American citizens would to-
day, if polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel
... in the light of all information presently available.172
Mr. Justice Marshall feels that exposure to factual information
about the death penalty would convince most citizens that its preserva-
tion is unwise as a matter of policy. The capital punishment facts that
Mr. Justice Marshall considers significant are: the threat of execution
cannot be proven to be a more effective deterrent to capital crime than
life imprisonment; it is more expensive to execute an offender than
to imprison him; and capital criminals are less susceptible to recidivism
than other types of offenders. Most persuasive of all, however, is the
evidence that death is inflicted arbitrarily and discriminatorily. If this
were widely known, Justice Marshall is certain that "even the most
hesitant citizens" would come to view capital punishment as morally
reprehensible. 7 3 He thus finds that capital punishment is repugnant
to the Constitution as it would be abhorrent to informed public opinion.
170 See text accompanying note 101, supra.
171 See text accompanying note 102, supra. The polls are inconclusive on the subject
of retention of the death penalty:
1936-62% favor death penalty for murder; Gallup Poll, March 23, 1960 (on file
with California Law Review).
1953- 68% favor death penalty for murder; N.Y. Times, February 16, 1969, at
47, col. 1.
1958-42% favor death penalty for murder; Roper Poll, February 9, 1958 (on file
with California Law Review).
1960-51% favor death penalty for murder; Gallup Poll, N.Y. Times, February
16, 1969, at 47, col. 1.
1965- 45% favor death penalty for murder; id.
1966- 38%-42% favor death penalty for murder; compare Gallup Poll, July 1,
1966 (on file with California Law Review), with Harris, Eye for an Eye
Rejected, Washington Post, July 3, 1966, § E, at 3, col. 3. See Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968) (United States is a "nation less than
half of whose people believe in the death penalty").
1969-51% favor death penalty for murder; Gallup Poll, N.Y. Times, February
16, 1969, at 47, col. 1.
1972-50% favor death penalty for murder; Gallup Poll, N.Y. Times, March 16,
1972, at 29, col. 2.
172 408 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added). The Justice here utilizes the test of "enlightened"
public opinion. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
173 Id. at 864.
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In condemning capital punishment, Justice Marshall is convinced that
we "achieve a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism"'174
and celebrate our regard for civilization and humanity. 7 5
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring
The brief opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart narrows the issue to
whether capital punishment as imposed under present legal procedures
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In concluding that it does,
Justice Stewart cites two separate reasons for his decision; first, that the
death sentences in these cases are cruel "in the sense that they exces-
sively go beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments that the
state legislatures have determined to be necessary,"'176 and, secondly,
that "the death penalty is infrequently imposed for murder, and its
imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare."' 77
174 R. CLARK, CRIME IN AM.RICA 336 (1970).
175 408 U.S. at 371.
176 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart here cites Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Apparently the Justice means that while the punishment is not
disproportionate to the crime, it goes beyond what the legislatures of Georgia and Texas
have deemed necessary to fulfill the policy of their states. This is evidenced by the fact
that they did not make the death penalty mandatory but, as an alternative, prescribed a
term of years as sufficient to achieve their ends.
177 Id. Statistics are extremely difficult to compile in this area. The most formidable
problem encountered at the outset of any inquiry into the frequency of imposition of the
death penalty is the dearth of reliable information relating to the actual number of
individuals convicted of a capital offense in any given year. The Uniform Crime Reports,
published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S., DEPARTMENT OF JusTIcE, FEDmA.
BuREu OF INvEGfATON, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTs (1971) [hereinafter U.C.R.]), offers
data on reported crimes and actual arrests but no record of convictions is included.
The National Prisoner Statistics, published by the Bureau of Prisons, supra note 138,
includes the number of executions per year, the number of prisoners received under
sentence of death during the year, and the number of individuals who have been sentenced
to death in the recent past, but does not present the number of those who have been
convicted of capital crimes. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Aikens v. California, No.
68-5027, app. F, cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 813 (1972), for a detailed exposition of the prob-
lem.
From these sources a rough picture can be composed of the attrition that occurs as
offenders are processed through the legal system en route to final punishment:
YEAR CRIMESO DEATH SENTENCES** EXECUTIONS8 * e
1961 25,520 140 42
1962 25,640 103 47
1963 28,840 93 21
1964 20,270 106 15
1965 32,820 86 7
1966 36,250 118 1
1967 39,190 85 2
1968 34,710 102 -
1969 51,060 97
1970 53,080 127
O U.C.R., supra, at 65. Crimes are all first degree murders and forcible rapes
reported for the years indicated.
a * N.P.S., supra, at 9.
0*1 Id. at 8. The last man executed in this country was Luis Monge, at the
Colorado State Prison, June 2, 1967.
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Justice Stewart does not reach the ultimate question whether the
death penalty is unconstitutional per se, a question that would be
squarely presented only in a situation involving a mandatory death
sentence for a particularly atrocious crime. In such a case, Justice
Stewart apparently feels that society's interests in retribution and de-
terrence might well outweigh any consideration of reform or rehabili-
tation.178 However, since the legislatures in the cases presented to the
Court for review did not enact automatic death penalty statutes, the
constitutionality of capital punishment need only be presently consid-
ered in the context of the legal systems wherein it arises.
In Justice Stewart's colorful phraseology, the death sentences in
these cases are cruel and unusual "in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual."'179 In other words, the pronounce-
ment of the death sentence here was entirely a matter of chance, 80 for
the petitioners' crimes were no more reprehensible than many of the
thousands of other offenses committed during the same time period
and for which perpetrators received lesser sentences.181 Since capital
These figures indicate, albeit imperfectly, the dimensions of the funnel at its extremi-
ties. See McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by a Correctional Administrator, 28 FED. PROB.
11, 12 (1964) (20% of persons convicted of murder in California received death penalty).
178Justice Stewart, while recognizing the inconclusive nature of the empirical
evidence regarding the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent, nevertheless indicates
that if it were automatically applied, it would provide the maximum deterrence to this
type of crime. Retribution is not viewed by the Justice as constitutionally impermissible
as it is rooted in man's nature and serves the important purpose of preventing vendettas
and self help. See 408 Us at 307-08.
'79 408 U.S. at 309.
180 The question of whether a capital criminal will be executed under the prevailing
system depends on so many different variables that the actual possibility of execution is
remote. The crime must be committed in one of the 36 states in which first degree murder
merits a capital penalty, one of the 16 states which permit execution for rape, or in
the federal jurisdiction, which allows capital punishment for both. Other crimes for
which death is the prescribed penalty are seldom committed. See N.P.S., supra note 138,
at 46-47, 50; see also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 942 (1972).
Some states authorize the death penalty but never impose it, or if they do impose it,
never carry it out; e.g., the last execution in New Hampshire was 1939, in Montana, 1944,
in Massachusetts, 1947, in South Dakota, 1949, in Delaware, 1949, in the District of
Columbia, 1959, in Idaho, 1959 and in Nebraska, 1959. See N.P.S., supra, at 10-11.
Apart from these and other geographical considerations, the discretionary aspect
of imposing the death penalty further serves to introduce the element of chance into
the proceedings. At each step in the process of the imposition of the death penalty, from
prosecutor, to judge and jury, to clemency board and governor, discretion is the hall-
mark of the system. As Ramsey Clark said while serving as Attorney General:
A small and capricous selection of offenders have been put to death. Most
persons convicted of the same crimes have been imprisoned. Experienced wardens
know many prisoners serving life or less whose crimes were equally, or more
atrocious, than those in death row.
Hearings, supra note 136, at 93.
181 Differences between sentences for the same offense imposed in different jurisdic-
tions is no cause for a finding of unconstitutionality; see Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391 (1916). However, recognizing that the penalty of death is final and irrevocable,
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punishment as imposed under the present legal system is so "wantonly"
and "freakishly" applied, it cannot be tolerated under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments.
Mr. Justice White, concurring
Justice White, like Justice Stewart, is concerned only with the
constitutionality of capital punishment under discretionary procedures
applicable in the country today. 82 He finds that none of the ends of
punishment 8 are fulfilled when the death penalty is so infrequently
imposed. 8 4 It is therefore evident to Justice White that the infliction
of capital punishment is unnecessary:
A penalty with such neglible returns to the State would be
patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of
the Eighth Amendment. 85
Mr. Justice White does not offer any empirical evidence of the
infrequency of imposition of the capital penalty, but relies on his per-
sonal experience as a judicial officer.186 Like Justices Stewart and
Douglas, he attributes the infrequent application of the death penalty
to the policy of discretionary sentencing, primarily exercised by juries,
which, in the Justice's opinion, has now "run its course."' 87
Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justices Powell, Blackmun
and Rehnquist, dissenting
arbitrariness can play no part in the imposition of the death sentence, for once the punish-
ment has been executed, further review is impossible. Mr. Justice Stewart indicates that
if any basis can be discerned for the selection of so few to die, it is the constitutionally
impermissible basis of race. 408 US. at 310.
182Justice White leaves the door open to the retention or enactment of mandatory
death sentences for first degree murder, for narrowly drawn categories of murder or for
rape. 408 U.S. at 310.
188 Retribution is impliedly approved as a method of reinforcement of community
values; deterrence would also be served if the death penalty were evenhandedly applied. Id.
at 311-12.
184 [A]s the statutes before us are now administered, the death penalty is so infre-
quently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial
service to criminal justice.
408 US. at 313.
185 Id. 312. In adopting the "necessity" test of excessive cruelty, see text accompanying
note 112 supra, Mr. Justice White is careful to preserve the distinction between excessive-
ness and disproportionality by emphasizing that death might be exactly what capital
offenders deserve no matter how infrequently it is imposed.
186 10 years of almost daily exposure to facts and circumstances of hundreds and
hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving crimes for which death is
the authorized penalty.
408 US. at 313.
187 "Infrequency," as Justice White uses the term, implies little of the flavor of
sub rosa arbitrariness that can be drawn from Justice Stewart's opinion. Justice White,
however, finds infrequency, or rarity, as the root cause of rendering capital punishment
unnecessary and attributes this infrequency to the discretionary sentencing system. He
does not venture further.
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The dissenting opinions are characterized primarily by their find-
ings that the Court's holding is incompatible with the cardinal princi-
ples of judicial restraint:188 i.e., stare decisis'8 9 and respect for the sepa-
ration of powers.190 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell present
comprehensive opinions which are also highly critical of the premises
upon which members of the majority have built their individual
concurrences, 191 while Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist limit their
opinions to condemnation of the lack of judicial restraint allegedly
exhibited by the majority. All four dissenters at bottom object to the
holding of the Court on jurisprudential grounds.
The concept of stare decisis, declare the dissenters, has been dealt
a serious blow by the majority's determination that the death penalty
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. They cite the long line of
cases from Wilkerson v. Utah 92 to McGautha v. California93 to support
the proposition that the validity of the death penalty was initially as-
sumed sub silentio and later openly approved by the Court:
In calling for a precipitous and final judicial end to this form
188"[Jjudicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not expressed, condition of the
grant of authority of judicial review." 408 U.S. at 470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
189 Stare decisis, if it is a doctrine founded on principle, surely applies where there
exists a long line of cases endorsing or necessarily assuming the validity of a
particular matter of constitutional interpretation.
408 US. at 428 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 189-
93 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
190 The highest judicial duty is to recognize the limits on judicial power and to
.ernmit the democratic processes to deal with matters falling outside of those
408 US. at 405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
191 E.g., Chief Justice Burger disputes the validity of the concept that excessiveness or
unnecessary cruelty is violative of the eighth amendment for both historical and jurispru-
dential reasons; it is not grounded in sound interpretation of the available precedents and
is a matter appropriately left to the legislative branch for final determination. 408 U.S. at
391-96; see id. at 451-56 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Neither Chief Justice Burger nor Justice Powell doubt the constitutionality of retribu-
tion as a legitimate end of punishment. 408 US. at 394 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
452-54 (Powell, J., dissenting). Nor do the Justices accept the ineffectiveness of the death
penalty as a deterrent in the light of the inconclusive nature of the statistical evidence.
408 US. at 395-96 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 454-56 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell vigorously deny that discrimination has
been proven in the cases at bar and they maintain that the infrequency of imposition of
the death penalty is due to the prudence and discretion exercised by judges and juries.
408 US. at 387-89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 443-50 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
The death penalty is not universally condemned by informed public opinion, for the
people, the legislatures and the members of juries, who are the true indicators of con-
temporary community sentiment, have made their attitude toward capital punishment
known by referenda, the retention of capital punishment statutes on the books, and by
the continued imposition of the death penalty. 408 US. at 385-91 (Burger, Cj., dissenting);
id. at 43343 (Powell, J., dissenting).
192 99 US. 130 (1878).
193 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (discretionary sentencing system upheld).
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of penalty as offensive to evolving standards of decency, petitioners
would have this Court abandon the traditional and refined ap-
proach consistently followed in its prior Eighth Amendment prece-
dents. 94
The dissenting Justices illustrate their contention that the major-
ity has ignored stare decisis by emphasizing that little more than one
year has elapsed since the discretionary sentencing system was upheld
in McGautha. This is clear evidence, in the dissenters' opinion, that
the Court has failed to exercise the proper deg'ee of judicial re-
straint.195 Attention to precedent is vital to the operation of our legal
system, say the dissenters, since it restrains judges from reading their
personal preferences into the Constitution under the rubric of uni-
versally held "standards of decency."'196 The dissenters find that the
Court has "sought and has achieved an end."'19 7
The dissenting Justices maintain that it is the basic function
of the legislatures to define and implement the standards of the com-
munity relating to the punishment of criminals. The Court should,
in the opinion of the dissenters, intrude in this area with the utmost
reticence.198 The majority has failed, in the dissenters' opinion, to
sustain the burden of overcoming the presumption of the constitu-
tionality of legislative enactments and the Court has therefore violated
the basic principles of judicial restraint.
Furman: CONFUSING THE COMPLEX
Furman v. Georgia presents a multitude of questions to the
student of constitutional development, not the least of which is the
scope of the decision itself. No single majority opinion was issued
beyond a brief per curiam statement and none of the five separate
concurring opinions was joined by any of the other Justices. An
analysis of the precise range of the Court's holding must therefore
proceed along the lines set by the narrowest of the concurring opinions,
those of Justices White and Stewart. 199
It would thus appear that Furman has invalidated all of the death
penalties imposed under the prevailing discretionary sentencing system
194 408 U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., dissenting).
195 408 U.S. at 399403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 427 (Powell, J., dissenting).
196 See 408 U.S. at 431 (Powell, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 414 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198 See id. at 383-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 410-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
id. at 431-3 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 466-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199 See text accompanying notes 176 and 182 supra.
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in the United States.200 McGautha v. California,201 which upheld the
discretionary system of sentencing offenders to death, has clearly been
dealt a mortal blow.202 Mr. Justice Powell described the effect of the
Court's holding in these words:
The capital punishment laws of no less than 39 States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia are nullified. In addition, numerous provisions
of the Criminal Code of the United States are also voided.203
Mandatory death sentences which have been imposed for "first
degree murder, for... narrowly defined categories of murder or for
rape"2 4 are unaffected by the Court's holding, for the opinions of
200 The Court's judgment removes the death sentences previously imposed on
some 600 persons awaiting punishment in state and federal prisons throughout
the country. At least for the present, it also bars the States and the Federal gov-
ernment from seeking sentences of death for defendants awaiting trial on charges
for which capital punishment was heretofore a potential alternative.
408 US. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
201402 U.S. 183 (1971). See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 397 (1972), (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting): "... . if the legislatures are to continue to authorize capital punishment for
some crimes, juries and judges can no longer be permitted to make the sentencing deter-
mination in the same manner they have in the past."
202 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 400 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
203 408 U.S. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting.). See also id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The death penalty provision of the federal aircraft hijacking statute, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)
(1970), has since been specifically declared unconstitutional in light of Furman. See United
States v. Bohle, - F. Supp. - (N.D.N.Y. 1972). The Senate and House of Representatives
have, however, separately passed anti-hijacking bills authorizing the imposition of the
death penalty at the discretion of the jury. See S. 2280, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R.
16191, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Senators Chiles, Javits and Kennedy questioned the
constitutionality of the measures. See 118 CONG. Rm. S15631, S15632 (daily ed. September
21, 1972). Senator Hughes cast the only negative vote in the Senate due to his op-
position to the death penalty. 118 CONG. REc. S15635 (daffy ed. September 21, 1972).
Mr. Justice Powell evaluated the gravity of the Furman holding in these words:
"Nothing short of an amendment to the United States Constitution can reverse the Court's
judgment." 408 U.S. at 462 (dissenting opinion). Justice Powell's statement fails to
provide for another method of reversal, that used to overcome McGautha. This is con-
sistent with the Justice's strict views on stare decisis.
The passage of a capital punishment amendment has already been proposed; see 118
CONG. REc. at H6477 (daily ed. June 30, 1972) (remarks of Mr. Wyman).
204 408 U.S. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
Mandatory death penalties imposed for crimes other than these would appear to be
invalidated by Furman. See
U.S. 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1971) (spying during wartime).
Ala. ALA. CoDE tit. 14, § 39 (1958) (assault or conspiracy to kill or maim a
prison guard or official by a life term prisoner).
Ariz. A.mz. R v. STAT. ANN. § 13-250 (1956) (armed assault by a life term pris-
oner); id. at § 13-701 (treason).
Ark. ARE. STAT. § 41-502 (1947) (arson of a prison by a convict); id. at § 41-2304
(kidnapping for ransom where victim is not returned unharmed).
Colo. CLo. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-49 (1963) (armed assault by escaping life
term prisoner).
La. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-113 (1950) (treason).
Miss. MIss. CODE ANN. § 2397 (1956) (treason).
Mont. MONT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 94-4501 (1969) (treason).
N.J. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A 148-1 (1951) (treason).
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Justices Douglas, White and Stewart make clear that they do not
reach the question whether a mandatory death penalty would be
unconstitutional for these crimes. At minimum, therefore, the decision
must be read to permit mandatory imposition of the death penalty
"for first degree murder, for more narrowly defined categories of
murder or for rape," 20 5 at least until the Court has opportunity to
examine such sentences.
The introduction of mandatory sentences for "more narrowly
defined" crimes would, however, certainly run afoul of the objection
articulated by McGautha:
The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would make
general standards either meaningless 'boilerplate' or a statement
of the obvious that no jury would need. 206
All past efforts "to identify before the fact" specific cases which warrant
capital punishment have been "uniformly unsuccessful," 20 7 for even
the most atrocious crime in the abstract must be evaluated in the light
of the circumstances under which it was committed, especially when
it is realized that the heinousness of the crime is all too frequently
proportional to the mental or emotional instability of the perpetrator.
The imposition of a mandatory death penalty for the commission of a
crime also forecloses any consideration whatsoever of the severity of
the offense in relation to others of the same genre. These considerations
can only be neglected at the risk of jury nullification.20 8 Even within
the framework of first degree murder, it is not unreasonable to assume
that a jury will distinguish between the mens rea of a cold-blooded
professional gunman and an individual guilty of felony murder,
euthanasia, foeticide,209 or dueling.210 If capital punishment must be
Vt. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3401 (1958) (treason).
Va. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-418 (1960) (treason).
Wash. WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 9.82.010 (1961) (treason).
205 408 U.S. at 310 (White, J., concurring). Even this statement should not be read
uncritically, however. It is possible, for example, that what Mr. Justice White intended
in listing "rape" was a rather narrow category of that crime, i.e., rape accompanied by
serious physical injury to the victim. One Circuit Court of Appeals has found that in no
other type of rape case would imposition of the death penalty be permissible under the
eighth amendment. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
206 402 US. 183, 208 (1971). See ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 498.
207 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 (1971).
208 See id. at 199. See also W. FORSYTH, HIsToRY OF TRIAL By JuRY 368 (2d ed. 1875).
Juries would not condemn men to the gallows for an offense of which the punish-
ment was all out of proportion to the crime, and as they could not mitigate the
sentence they brought in verdicts of not guilty.209 Georgia treats foeticide as first degree murder. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9921a (1971).
210 Several states consider homicide by dueling to be first degree murder. E.g., Amx
STAT. ANN. § 41-2213 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.05 (1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3403
(1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692.1 (1950); Tax. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1260 (1961).
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imposed on the latter individual, the jury will inevitably be tempted
to bring in a conviction of lesser degree homicide. If this option is
closed, the prosecution runs the further risk of acquittal. Nevertheless,
it must be regarded as likely that some legislatures, responding to
public sentiment or political pressure, will attempt to institute
mandatory death penalties for such crimes as the murder of police-
men or correctional officers. 211
Furman leaves the status of the petitioners and other death row
inmates totally unresolved. Remanding the cases for "further pro-
ceedings," the Court reversed the lower court judgments in each case
only insofar as they left undisturbed the death sentence imposed.212
The Court failed to outline the nature of the remand proceedings.
The precedents in the area are meager. The California Supreme
Court, in declaring the death penalty void under the state constitution,
specifically substituted a life sentence for the appellant's voided death
sentence 2 13 and made the holding in the case fully retroactive. The
California opinion also included instructions as to the procedure to
be followed to obtain similar modifications in other cases. 14 In 1970,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in overturning the death sentence
211 See, e.g., S. 3914, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
A week after Furman was decided, the Philadelphia District Attorney asked the Penn-
sylvania Legislature to enact legislation authorizing the imposition of the death penalty
for crimes such as the murder of a policeman, assassination, a contracted murder, murder
by a parolee previously convicted of murder, murder by a life term convict, murder com-
mitted during the commission of arson, rape, robbery or burglary where the defendant
was previously convicted of those crimes, and murder resulting from a hijacking. See 11
C r. L. RE'. 2424 (August 9, 1972). Presumably the death penalty for these crimes would
be mandatory.
After the Anderson decision, California experienced the same reaction to the banning
of capital punishment; an amendment to the California Constitution was introduced to
reestablish the death penalty. See 11 Ciur. L. REP. 2079 (April 26, 1972). While Proposition
17 was permitted to remain on the ballot, it is clear that, because of Furman, discretionary
death penalties could not be reinstated by any such amendment to a state constitution.
See generally White v. Brown,-F.2d-(9th Cir. 1972).
A special committee on capital punishment of the National Association of Attorneys
General was convened for the purpose of drafting model legislation for the reinstatement
of the death penalty. Members of the committee were divided in opinion as to whether
such legislation would pass judicial muster. See 168 N.Y.L.J. 75, October 18, 1972, at 6,
col. 4. See text accompanying note 167 supra.
212408 U.S. at 240. The Court also vacated judgment as to the death penalty and
remanded "for further proceedings" 119 pending cases, 408 U.S. at 845, 932-41 (1972), and
disposed of four others summarily by vacating judgments as to the death penalty without
a remanding, id. at -. In No. 204 O.T. 1970, Crampton v. Ohio, a companion case to
McGautha, the Court granted rehearing and vacated its previous judgment reported in 402
U.S. 183 (1971). The death penalty affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio was vacated and
the case remanded for "further proceedings." 408 U.S. at 941 (1972). This action further
illustrates the Court's displeasure with McGautha.
213 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657, 493 P.2d 880, 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171,
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
214 Id.
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of a convicted rapist on cruel and unusual punishment grounds,
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to withhold
a writ of habeas corpus for a reasonable time to permit the state to
impose a "penalty other than death.1215 It is unlikely that federal or
state courts would impose on remand a sentence other than life im-
prisonment. Whether parole would then be permitted is a question yet
to be decided.216
The elimination of capital punishment by the California Supreme
Court in Anderson quickly produced requests for bail from those
charged with capital offenses to whom it had been prohibited by
statute. The California court modified its decision to include a para-
graph denying bail to these individuals, declaring that the gravity
of the offenses was unaffected by the decision. 217 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey declined, however, to agree with its California counterpart.
In State v. Johnson,21 the court reasoned that since the New Jersey
capital punishment statutes were invalid, bail could not be denied to
the "capital" offender.21 9 This is certainly an appropriate area for
legislative action.
215 Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
216 In reaction to Furman, the Florida legislature enacted a statute, to take effect on
October 1, 1972, requiring substitution of a life sentence without possibility of parole for
a death sentence voided by Furman. On September 9, 1972, the Supreme Court of Florida
rendered this statute meaningless, however, by commuting the death sentences of 40 killers
and rapists to life imprisonment and making these convicts eligible for eventual parole.
In addition, the court indicated that a prison term short of life might be considered if the
trial court found some reason to grant mercy to convicted rapists. See N.Y. Times, Sept.
10, 1972, at 35, col. 1.
Perhaps the lesser sentence might be imposed for rape without serious bodily injury
to the victim. See note 205 supra.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has gone a step further. In State v. Speck, -Il. 2d-,
- NX.2d- (1972), the court declined to automatically commute death sentences which
were invalidated by Furman to life imprisonment. Instead the court mandated a full de
novo sentencing rehearing for convicted mass-murderer Richard Speck. The re-sentencing
procedure will permit the admission of evidence of extenuating and mitigating circum-
stances which arose after the original sentencing.
However, courts have ruled that sentences invalidated by Furman must be changed
to life imprisonment. See, e.g., Eaton v. Capps, - F. Supp. - (M.D. Ala. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Ross, - Pa. -, - A.2d - (1972); State v. Johnson, - A.2d - (Del. Super. Ct.
1972).
A Texas district attorney's efforts to commute voided death sentences to life imprison-
ment were met with a request for a federal restraining order by a former death row
inmate. The petitioner reasoned that since the original sentence of death was jury im-
posed, any new penalty must similarly be imposed by a jury at a new trial. The federal
district court declined to grant the relief requested, stating that Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), bars interference in the state proceedings at this stage because the harm
caused by the commutation was neither immediate or irreparable, nor was the prosecu-
tor acting in "bad faith". Payton v. Vance, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Tex. 1972).
217 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657 n.45, 493 P.2d 880, 899, n.45, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 171 nA5, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). Accord, People v. District Court, -
Colo. -, - P.2d -(1972). The Colorado statute was voided by Furman.
218 - N.J. -, 294 A.2d 245 (1972).
219Accord, Ex parte Contella,-S.W.2d- (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Following the
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Furman v. Georgia must certainly be viewed as a reaflirmance
of the principle that punishments must be evenhandedly and non-
arbitrarily applied. But the extreme narrowness of the minimum
grounds of the decision and the inability of any majority Justice to
join in the opinion of any other all but foreclose the application of any
of the various rationales offered by the Justices to any other method
of punishment.
The very uniqueness of the death penalty as a punishment is
clearly stressed in the broadest of the concurring opinions, those of
Justices Brennan and Marshall. 220 This concept of uniqueness necessi-
tates a most conservative approach in evaluating the ramifications of
Furman in other areas of the law.
Nevertheless, challenges to other penalties are certain to follow
in the wake of Furman. Such challenges are likely to utilize two tests
found in the concurring opinions: the "necessity" test of excessive
cruelty221 accepted by four members of the majority222 and the concept
of "infrequency" mentioned by two of the Justices.
An argument for an extension of Furman on the basis of the
"necessity" test would reason that if a punishment is excessive, i.e., is
unnecessary to achieve the ends of criminal justice, it should be struck
down as violative of the eighth amendment. The Chief Justice dis-
cussed some implications of this argument:
If it were proper to put the States to the test of demonstrating
the deterrent value of capital punishment, we could just as well
ask them to prove the need for life imprisonment or any other
punishment. Yet I know of no convincing evidence that life im-
prisonment is a more effective deterrent than 20 years' imprison-
ment, or even that a 510 parking ticket is a more effective deterrent
than a $5 parking ticket. In fact, there are some who go so far as
to challenge the notion that any punishments deter crime. If the
States are unable to adduce convincing proof rebutting such asser-
mandate of Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971), the Supreme Court of New Jersey
struck down the state capital punishment statute in State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286
A.2d 55, cert. denied, 408 U.S. -(1972). The Texas statute was invalidated by Furman.
220 See 408 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Death is a unique punishment
in the United States'); id. at 346 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("death has always been
viewed as the ultimate punishment'). Cf. id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("It [the
death penalty] is unique in its total irrevocability').
221 See text accompanying note 112 supra.
222 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring) ('The final principle inherent in
the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive
if it is unnecessary'); id. at 312 (White, J., concurring) ("A penalty with such negligible
returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment viola-
tive of the Eighth Amendment'); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("these sentences are
'cruel' in the sense that they go beyond ... the punishments that the state legislatures
have determined to be necessary'); id. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("a penalty may be
cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose').
19721
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tions, does it then follow that all punishments are suspect of being
"cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Constitution?223
Chief Justice Burger's fear that all criminal penalties may now
be suspect as cruel and unusual is clearly unwarranted for, even
if deterrence and vengeance are discounted arguendo, incarceration of
the criminal for the purposes of rehabilitation and the prevention
of recidivism is still a wholly necessary and legitimate end of criminal
justice. And it is plainly the province of the legislature, subject to
only limited judicial review, 224 to determine what term of years will
best serve this end.
The concept of "infrequency" will also offer little basis for the
expansion of Furman to penalties other than death. Mr. Justice White
attributes the failure of the death penalty to serve as a credible deter-
rent to capital crime or an effective expression of moral condemnation
to the infrequency with which it is imposed. It is therefore unneces-
sarily cruel and violative of the eighth amendment. Mr. Justice Stewart,
on the other hand, in adopting the rationale that the infrequency with
which a penalty is exacted renders it suspect on eighth amendment
grounds,2 5 does no more than verbalize the proposition that rare
imposition is symptomatic of arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory
enforcement of the laws. The Justice does not condemn infrequency
per se but rather utilizes it as evidence that the system by which the
penalty is imposed leaves the door open to less than evenhanded
justice. The Chief Justice characterizes this underlying concern in
these terms:
The decisive grievance of the opinions ... is that the present
system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to pro-
duce evenhanded justice; the problem is not that too few have
been sentenced to death, but that the selection process has followed
no rational pattern.220
It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the mere infrequency with
which a particular penalty is imposed will serve as anything more
223 408 U.S. at 396 (dissenting opinion).
Justice Marshall answers this argument by stating that anyone challenging these pen-
alties will have to bear the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of the validity of
statutes passed by a legislature and he notes that the challengers of the death penalty
have overcome this burden by 200 years of debate, inquiry and evidence gathering. Id. at
359 n.141 (concurring opinion).
224 Id. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell uses the terms "grossly excessive"
and "greatly disproportionate" to emphasize that the Court's power to strike down punish-
ments as excessive must be exercised with the "greatest circumspection."
See also text accompanying note 79 supra.
225 See text accompanying note 116 supra.
226 408 U.S. at 398-99 (dissenting opinion).
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than a warning of the possibility of injustice. If arbitrary or dis-
criminatory punishment is then found, the Court is equipped to deal
with it by traditional due process and equal protection means.
The majority's displeasure with the discretionary sentencing
system is, however, likely to lead to challenges of other exercises of
discretion in the judicial system, most notably that utilized by judges
in fixing prison terms or in granting probation where no discernible
standards are employed. While this exercise of judicial discretion has
long been deemed, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, an
inappropriate area for federal judicial review, 227 perhaps the emphasis
the Furman majority placed upon the evenhanded application of justice
may spur the courts to reexamine their standards for the judicial review
of a judge's discretionary power. 2 However, this reexamination is
227 See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972); Gore v. United States,
357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (problems relating to judges' power to review sentences are "partic-
ularly questions of legislative policy"); Blockburger v. United States, 284 US. 229, 305
(1932); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 244 U.S. 8538
(1952) ("an appellate court has no power to modify a sentence"); Gurera v. United States,
40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930).
This solid wall of federal precedent has been breached; see United States v. Daniels,
446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971). The court of appeals remanded Daniels' case to the district
court with instructions to impose a reduced sentence. The court found it to be an abuse of
discretion by the district judge to sentence the defendant to the maximum statutory period
despite uncontested evidence of mitigating circumstances. See Note, Daniels v. United
States: Appellate Review of Criminal Sentencing- Limiting the Scope of the Non-Review
Doctrine, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 917 (1972).
Although the Daniels case is an aberration in federal law, the power of appellate
courts to engage in some form of sentencing review has been recognized in 21 states. See
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENcEs 13-15, 67-85 (1968); Mueller,
Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L. Ray.
671, 688-97 (1962) for a collection of relevant statutes and decisions.
Quite independently of Furman, the subject of judicial discretion in sentencing has
become a center of heated controversy in New York. The New York statute authorizing
appellate review of sentencing (N.Y. CaM. PRo. LAw § 470.15 (McKinney 1971)), has failed
to reduce sentencing disparities. See N.Y. Times, October 2, 1972, at 40, col. 1. One solu-
tion which has been implemented on an experimental basis in New York City is the
establishment of three-judge "sentencing panels" at the trial court level to review all
cases prior to sentencing. See N.Y. Times, October 3, 1972, at 1, col. 1. The Chief Judge of
the New York Court of Appeals has gone even further, suggesting that judges be com-
pletely divested of sentencing power and that it be delegated instead to correction officials
or a specially instituted agency. Id.
Furman may provide the impetus for appellate review of sentences in those juris-
dictions which have not yet provided that safeguard. Action is more likely in the federal
system, however, due to the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the federal judiciary.
See generally McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); Note, The Supervisory
Powers of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
228 Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking of appellate review of sentencing, has stated:
It is an anomaly that a judicial system which has developed so scrupulous a con-
cern for the protection of a criminal defendant throughout every other stage of
the proceedings against him should have so neglected this most important dimen-
sion of fundamental justice.
Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958). See Weigel, Appellate Revision
of Sentences: To Make The Punishment Fit The Crime, 20 STAN. L. REv. 405 (1968). The
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more likely to take the form of promulgating stricter sentencing
standards than of abolishing judicial discretion in this area.
CONCLUSION
The complexity of the capital punishment controversy is dearly
illustrated by the nine separate opinions filed in the case. The members
of the majority have, however, added to the confusion surrounding
the issue by failing to agree on a single common ground for con-
demnation of the death penalty. As a result of their failure, the future
of capital punishment must remain in limbo until a mandatory death
penalty statute is reviewed by the Court.
When such an event finally occurs, challengers will be hard-pressed
to overcome the unwillingness of Justices White and Stewart to find
retribution an impermissible end of criminal punishment 229 and their
refusal to acknowledge the ineffectiveness of the death penalty as a
deterrent.280 The attitudes of these two members of the Furman
majority undermine the utility of the "excessiveness" argument against
capital punishment in future Supreme Court challenges.
Justices Marshall and Brennan find capital punishment per se
violative of the eighth amendment and offer the convincing rationale
that capital punishment now stands condemned by "enlightened public
opinion."231 The other Justices in the majority failed to embrace this
reasoning, and this impasse makes it highly unlikely that capital
punishment will be judicially eliminated by the Supreme Court in
the foreseeable future.
A less obvious result of the other majority members' rejection
of the per se argument is that the combination of rationales appears to
promise more in the way of possible application to other penalties
than the authors actually intended to offer. A possible consequence is
that the next few years will see numerous constitutional challenges
to various state penalty schemes, challenges that, for reasons discussed
above, will ultimately meet disappointment.
Although total judicial elimination of capital punishment is not
disparities between sentences for similar crimes would have to be greatly excessive to entitle
the defendant to appellate review. Id. at 409.
229 408 U.S. at 808 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I cannot agree that retribution is a
constitutionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment'); id. at 311
(White, J., concurring) ("those executed may deserve exactly what they received").
230 408 U.S at 307-08 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("despite the inconclusive empirical
evidence, only the automatic penalty of death will provide maximum deterence"); id. at
312 (White, J., concurring) ("I . . . need not reject the death penalty as a more effective
deterrent than a lesser punishment').
231408 U.S. at 296-300 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360-69 (Marshall, J., concurring).
See text accompanying notes 103 and 173 supra.
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likely to occur in the near future, Furman has necessitated legislative
review of the entire capital punishment issue.232 This reevaluation will
undoubtedly result in the repeal of even those mandatory death penalty
statutes presently employed by many jurisdictions. In a kind of counter-
effect, other jurisdictions are almost equally certain to move toward
mandating capital punishment for certain crimes but, if past experi-
ence is any guide, such newly enacted mandatory death penalties will
be short-lived.2 33 It is this long-range accomplishment that saves the
deathknell tolled by Furman v. Georgia from sounding a hollow ring.
232408 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("legislative bodies have been given
the opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility, to make a thorough re-evaluation
of the entire subject of capital punishment').
A complete reevaluation of the capital punishment issue has begun in Florida. See 11
Canf. L. REP. 2508 (September 6, 1972). A similar inquiry has been initiated in New York.
See N.Y. Times, October 17, 1972, at 26, col. 2.
233See text accompanying notes 206-210 supra. Justice Blackmun characterizes the
possible post-Furman institution of mandatory death penalties as "regressive and of an
antique mold, for it eliminates the element of mercy in the imposition of punishment."
408 US. at 413 (dissenting opinion).
